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Notes and Comment
Accord and Satisfaction: Disputed or unliquidated claim as
affected by an offset claimed by the debtor.-Scott, J., writing the
prevailing opinion in Frank v. Vogt, x78 App. Div. (N. Y.) 833 (x917),'
held that there was no accord and satisfaction where merchandise was
sold and delivered under an express contract of sale, and.the vendor in
payment therefor sent a check "in full" for the agreed purchase price
minus a deduction of 5%, the deduction being justified by the claim
that the goods were not up to the agreed quality, which check was
accepted and used by the vendor. In the language of the court:
"That defendant, when he sent the check, wrote that he was sending
it as full payment does not affect the question. He could not by
paying an amount admittedly due in any event, foreclose plaintiffs
from claiming that more was due, nor yet subject them to the risk of
postponing the payment of the whole claim, until defendant's rela-
tively small counterclaim could be judicially liquidated. To hold
otherwise would result, in many cases, in permitting a debtor to
coerce his creditor into making an unjustified deduction from his bill."
By the weight of authority, an assertion of an offset or damages
arising otit of the same transaction on which a claim is based, will
render such claim unliquidated, even though the primary claim itself
is undisputed except in respect of the damages or offset asserted.2
However, there is strong authority in New York and elsewhere of
which the instant case is an example which is seemingly squarely in
conflict with that rule.3 Yet even in New York there are decisions in
accord with the weight of authority,4 so the question may to some
extent be regarded as still open.
The jurisdictions that are in accord with the weight of authority
take the view that there is no material difference between a dispute
involving the primary claim itself, and a dispute involving an offset
against the claim; that there is a dispute, whatever may have given
rise to it.5 The instant case, and others analogous, reason that, as at
least part of the claim is admitted, and only so much is paid as is
admitted to be due, there is no consideration to satisfy the disputed
balance.
In its final analysis, the question resolves itself into an inquiry as to
whether a disputed offset arising out of the same transaction on which
'Reversing Frank v. Vogt, 97 Misc. (N. Y.) 674 (i916).
20strander v. Scott, 16I Ill. 339 (1896); Tanner v. Merrill, io8 Mich. 58 (1895);
Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co. v. New York, 99 App. Div. (N. Y.) 327 (I9O4); Hull
v. Johnson, 22 R. . 66 (i9oo).
3Kinefelter v. Granger, 152 App. Div. (N. Y.) 896 (1912); Windmuller v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 424 (i9o8); Demeules v.
Jewel Tea Co., 103 Minn. i5o (i9o8).4Jackson v. Volkening, 8i App. Div. (N. Y.) 36 (19o3), affirmed without opinion
in 178 N. Y. 562 (1904); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Tonawanda Co., 107 App. Div.(N. Y.) 90 (1905), affirmed without opinion in 186 N. Y. 563 (i9o6); Fuller v.
Kemp, I38 N. Y. 231 (1893); Ravenswood Paper Mill Co. v. Dix, 6x Misc.(N. Y.) 235 (i9o8); Brewster v. Silverstein, 78 Misc. (N. Y.) 123 (1912).
5Hull v. Johnson, supra, note 2.
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the primary claim is based renders the whole claim unliquidated. It
is difficult to see how a claim, any part of which is in dispute, can be
liquidated within the rules governing accord and satisfaction, for as
said in Nassoiy v. Tomlinson,6 unless it appears how much is due, the
demand is not liquidated, even though it appear that something is due.
It hardly seems correct to say that the payment of a balance due
after deducting a variable offset goes only in consideration of that
part of the primary claim which is admittedly due. In the instant
case no separate and distinct part is admitted to be due, for that which
defendant offered was in full payment of the whole claim and not to
any individual part thereof. It should be immaterial as to how the
debtor computed the amount which he offers in satisfaction of the
claim, except perhaps in so far as it tends to show a bonafide dispute,
yet the courts substantially ground their reasoning thereon.
And even if the conclusion is reached that the debtor has admitted
a certain sum to be due, yet he undoubtedly denies that the full claim
is due, for his reserved admission that there is but a part due is in
itself pregnant with denial of any greater liability. And by the weight
of authority, if one of two specific sums is admitted to be due but
there is a dispute as to which is the correct amount, the claim is to be
considered unliquidated within the meaning of that word in its appli-
cation to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.7
Frederic M. Hoskins, 'g.
Descent and Distribution: Right of inheritance from adopted
child.-In Brewer v. Browning, 76 So. (Miss.) 267 (1917), an infant
died unmarried and without issue. The infant had been adopted
some years before by a family named Rule. Mr. Rule died intestate
some time after the adoption and the adopted child inherited from
him a large amount of property. After the infant's death, her
property was claimed by her natural brothers and sisters and by her
adoptive mother. Several other questions were involved in this
action, but only this question will be considered here. The Missis-
sippi statute regulating adoption has the following clause: "* * * *
and thereafter [after decree of adoption by the court] the petitioner
shall have and exercise over such person so adopted all such power and
control as parents have over their own children."' In a former
decision of a case arising between the same parties, the court had held
that the natural brothers and sisters would take the property.2 In
the principal case, the former decision was repudiated, and the adop-
tive mother was held to be entitled to the property which the deceased
had inherited* from the adoptive father; this result was said to be
"more consistent with justice," and to best harmonize with the public
policy in encouraging adoption.
6148 N. Y. 326 (1896).
7Greenlee v. Mosnat, i16 Iowa 535 (19o2); Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875 (1896);
Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, supra, note 6.
'Hemingway's Ann. Miss. Code, sec. 299.
2Fisher v. Browning, 107 Miss. 729 (1914).
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Since adoption was unknown at common law and is made possible
only by statute,3 the question as to the right of the adoptive parent to
inherit from the adopted child when the latter dies unmarried and
without issue is largely one of statutory interpretation. The different
wording of the statutes, however, does not alone account for the
conflicting decisions in the various jurisdictions.
In many states it has been held that in the absence of a clause in the
statute expressly providing for inheritance by the adoptive parents,
property held by the child, no matter from what source acquired, will
descend to the natural parents or other blood relatives, rather than to
the adoptive next of kin.4 This result is reached by a very strict
construction of the statutes relating to adoption; the courts refuse to
change the common law in any way not expressly ordered by statute.
This rule would seem to 6btain in a majority of jurisdictions.
Other states hold that the relationship of parent and child is
established by the adoption; that the adoptive parents take the place
of the natural parents in every way, and therefore inherit all the
child's property.5
Still other jurisdictions make the criterion the original source of the
property. If acquired from the natural parents, it goes to the blood
relatives; if acquired from the adoptive parents, it goes to the adop-
tive next of kin.
It would seem that the rule giving all the property to the adoptive
parent or the adoptive next of kin would be the correct one, if the
view were taken that the adoption not only creates the relation of
parent and child between the parties to the adoption, but also destroys
that relation between the child and the natural parents. But as the
law exists, recognizing the adopted child's relationship to its blood kin
for the purpose of inheriting from them, an unfair result is sometimes
reached by applying such a rule.7  On the other hand, the refusal of
the courts in many states to recognize the existence of the family
3Spencer, Doam. Rel., sec. 464.
4White v. Dotter, 73 Ark. 130 (904); Russell v. Jordan, t8 Colo. 445 (1915);
Estate of Namauu, 3 Haw. 484 (1873); Baker v. Clowser, x58 Ia. 156 (1912);
Reinders v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482 (1878); Edwards v. Yearby, I68 N. C. 663(1915); Daisey's Estate, I5 W. N. C. (Pa.) 4o3 (1884); Commonwealth v. Powel,
16W. N. C. (Pa.) 297 (1885); Murphy v. Portrum, 95 Tenn. 605 (1895); Hole v.
Robbins, 53 Wis. 514 (i88i). In Heidecamp v. Jersey City St. Ry. Co., 69
N. J. L. 284 (1903), it was held that the adoptive parents were not entitled to sue
as the next of kin under the Death Act.5Estate of Jobson, 164 Cal. 312 (1912); Humphries v. Davis, I00 Ind. 274(1884), over ruling Barnhizel v. Ferrell, 47 Ind. 335 (1874); Paul v. Davis, 100
Ind. 422 (1884); Dunn v.'Means, 48 Ind. App. 383 (91); Calhoun v. Bryant,
28 S. D. 266 (191i); In re Havsgord, 34 S. D. 13i1 (1914). This is the rule in
Minnesota by Gen. St. Minn., Sec. 7156. In Carpenter v. Buffalo Electric Co.,
213 N.Y. 1o (1914), it was held that the adoptive parents were the proper parties
to sue as next of kin under the Death Act.6Swick v. Coleman, 218 111.33 (i9o5), decided under express statutory provision.
Lanferman v. Vanzile, 150 Ky. 751 (1912); MacMaster v. Fobes, 226 Mass. 396
(1917), decided under express statutory provision; Upson v. Noble, 35 Oh. St.
655 (-i88o).7Wagner v. Varner, 50 Ia. 532 (1879); Humphries v. Davis, supra, note 5;
Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47 (1897).
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relationship between the child and the adoptive parents for the pur-
pose of inheritance from the child disregards the spirit of the adoption
statutes, and at times works an unfair result to the adopting family.8
Certainly an equitable qualification on either rule, though one
which is not always easily applied, is that established by statute in
some states, that the property shall descend to the family from which
it came.9 In its decision that, at least in the case of property received
from the adoptive family, the rights of that family to inherit should be
held superior to that of the blood kin, the court in the principal case
seems to have reached a just result. It is submitted that the pro-
visions of the Massachusetts statute are most satisfactory,10 which
provide that property acquired by the adopted child through his own
efforts shall go to his adoptive family, and that property which has
come to him from either family shall be inherited by that family.
Richard H. Brown, 'V9.
Divorce: Effect of statute forbidding remarriage.-Woodward v.
Blake, 164 N. W. (N. D.) 156 (1917), presents the question of inter-
pretation of statutes forbidding the remarriage of divorced persons;
and Hall v. Industrial Commission, z62 N. W. (Wis.) 3X2 (1917), the
question of what effect shall be given such statutes in a foreign juris-
diction. In the North Dakota case the statute read: "The effect of
a judgment decreeing a divorce is to restore the parties to the state of
unmarried persons, except that neither party to a divorce may marry
within three months after the time such decree is granted." The
court held that a marriage contracted within the state by a divorced
person less than three months after the decree was granted was not
void and could not be assailed collaterally upon the probate of such
person's estate. The opinion is based upon the reason that since the
legislature had, in numerous other statutes, expressly declared certain
marriages void and others voidable, the intent to make this the one
or the other was not clear and since marriage is regarded with favor
by the law, statutes should not be so construed as to make a mar-
riage null unless the language of the statute makes thejlegislative
intent clear and unequivocal. Upon this basis of decision, the infer-
ence may be drawn that the court would not have held the marriage
voidable.
Statutes prohibiting remarriage after divorce, but silent as to the
effect of disobedience, are either directory or mandatory. If deemed
directory, the marriage is usually held valid, or at most voidable; if
mandatory, the marriage is void.' The question is one of legislative
intent and the holdings of the various courts are conflicting, due partly
to the different wording of similar statutes.
Since there is a presumption in favor of marriage, the courts have
construed strictly statutes merely prohibitory upon both parties,
8See comment in 39 Am. St. Rep. 228.9Jones & Add. Ill. Stat. Ann., sec. 198; Mass. Rev. Laws, ch. 154, sec.7; Howell's
Mich. Stat. (2d ed.), sec. 1o972.
"°Supra, note 9.
'Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, see. 423.
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holding them to be merely directory and a marriage of one of the
parties within the prescribed time valid.2 Another form of pro-
hibitory statute forbids the marriage of the guilty party to the
divorce during the lifetime of the other party,3 more particularly
where the divorce was granted for adultery,4 and sometimes have an
additional clause that persons so marrying shall be guilty of bigamy,5
or making such marriage a felony.6 Marriage in violation of this
class of statutes has generally been held to be invalid.7
The New York courts hold that the marriage of the guilty party to
a divorce action for adultery, contrary to a prohibitory statute, is
void.8 But, under a statute declaring that "every person having a
husband or wife living" who shall marry again shall be adjudged guilty
of bigamy, they have adopted the peculiar doctrine that, for the pur-
pose of this statute, one marrying contrary to the prohibitory statute
is regarded as having a husband or wife living.'
It is to be noted in this connection that the only statutes on this
subject in some states, forbid remarriage during the time allowed to
appeal from the judgment decreeing divorce and until the determina-
tion of such'appeal if taken. Under this form of statute, a remarriage
of one the parties is generally held void, the courts in most instances
holding that the decree of divorce is not complete and does not take
effect until the end of the prescribed period.10
In the Wisconsin case, the plaintiff secured a divorce in Illinois
under a statute which provided that neither party could marry unless
with each other, within one year, and declared such a marriage void
and provided. punishment by imprisonment' for violation. The
plaintiff and another resident of Illinois were married in Indiana in
compliance with the laws of that state within the year, then later went
to Wisconsin and lived as husband and wife until the death of the
husband for which the plaintiff now made claim for damages. The
Wisconsin court -held the marriage invalid, on the ground that
Wisconsin, having a statute similar to the one in Illinois which made
marriage invalid whether contracted within the state or without, had
2Conn v. Con, 2 Kan. App. 419 (1895); contra, Warter v. Warter, 15 Prob.
Div. (Eng.) 152 (1890); Mason v. Mason, ioi Ind. 25 (1884), marriage voidable,
but see for effect if decree of divorce is opened; State v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 5o3
(I9ii), marriage voidable but sufficient for prosecution for bigamy.
3West Cambridge v. Lexington, I Pick. (Mass.) 5o5 (1823); Elliot v. Elliot, 38
Md. 357 (1873).4Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873); Cropsey v. Ogden, ii N. Y.
228 (1854).
6White v. White, 105 Mass. 325 (1870); Williams v. Oates, 5 Ired. (N. C.) 535(1845).
'Calloway v. Bryan, 51 N. C. 569 (1859); State v. Sartwell, 8I Vt. 22 (19o8).7See notes 3, 4, 5, and 6 for cases holding marriages invalid; contra, Adams v.
Adams, 2 Ches. Co. Rep. (Pa.) 56o (1885); Park v. Barron, 2o Ga. 702 (1856),
marriage not void for statute doesn't say so, but may be prosecuted for bigamy.8Cropsey v. Ogden, supra, note 4.9People v. Faber, 92 N. Y. 146 (1883).10Griswold v. Griswold, 23 Col. App. 365 (1913); Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Ia.
142 (i91i); Wilhite v. Whilhite, 41 Kan. 154 (1889), interpreting the Oregon
statute; Eaton v. Eaton, 66 Neb. 676 (1902); McLennan v. McLennan, 31 Or.
480 (1897); State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 56z (1907).
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the same declared public policy with reference to prohibited extra-
territorial marriges. The court declared also that the Illinois
statute must be deemed imported into the plaintiff's divorce decree
and that a statute of Wisconsin required that its courts give full faith
and credit to divorce decrees rendered in other states.
This case presents the question of what extra-territorial effect such
statutes have. The simplest case arising in this connection is the
effect of a marriage contracted in a foreign jurisdiction when the
question is determined by the courts of the domestic forum. Where
the statute merely prohibits the marriage it will generally be held
good though contracted in another state, since the statute is deemed
merely directory and a marriage within the state would be good."
If a marriage under such statute, when contracted within the state,
is held void, there seems to be a conflict as to the effect that will be
given a marriage contracted in a foreign state contrary to the prohibi-
tion. The general rule is that the "lex loci contractus" governs and a
marriage valid in the state where contracted is good everywhere, 2
and this applies even where the parties are married in the foreign state
to avoid the statute. 3 This rule is based on the ground of comity and
the general rules of contract. Exceptions are made to this rule, how-
ever, when such marriage is contrary to natural laws or to the public
policy of the domestic forum.' 4 Thus it is sometimes held that the
legislative intent is to declare the early marriage of divorced parties
contrary to the public policy of the state and a marriage outside the
state will be held void. 5 Some courts make a distinction as to the
formalities and the essentials of the marriage contract, holding that in
the former the "lex loci contractus" governs; in the latter the "lex
domicilii.' 6 Under this doctrine, prohibitory statutes are held to
affect the capacity of the parties which is one of the essentials of the
contract and will make a foreign marriage invalid.17 Again where the
courts hold that the statute has the effect of suspending the decree of
divorce, a marriage contrary to it will be bigamous and come within
the first exception to the general rule as being contrary to natural
laws. Not all of the courts have, however, recognized the general
rule that the "lex loci contractus" governs, some holding that to give
effect to a marriage in a foreign state in violation of its own statutes
would be to make its own laws on the subject of no effect.'8
nCrawford v. State, 73 Miss. 172 (x895); contra, Leev. Lee, I5o Ia. 6II (1911);
Phillips v. Madrid, 83 Me. 205 (I89i); Frame v. Thorman, 102 Wis. 653 (1899).12Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, sec. 838; Est. of Wood, 137 Cal.
29 (I9) .est Cambridge v. Lexington, supra, note 3; State v. Shattuck, 69Vt. 403 (1897).
"Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass.. 157 (1819); contra under different statute,
Whippen v. Whippen, ii Mass. 560 (1898).
"Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ill. 46o (1912); State v. Fenn, supra, note i0; Lanham
v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360 (19o8).
"5Wilson v. Cook, supra, note 14; Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704 (1907);
Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244 (i888)i Lanham v. Lanham, supra, note 14.
"Brook v. Brook, 9 H. of L. Cases (Eng.) 193 (1861)..
27See Story, Confict of Laws (8th ed.), sec. 124; Williams v. Oates, supra,
note 5.
'sWarter v. Warter, supra, note 2; Williams v. Williams, supra, note 5; Est.
of Stull, 183 Pa. St. 625 (1898); Pennegar v. State, supra, note i5.
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The Wisconsin case goes a step farther and in a choice between the
recognition of the law of divorce of one state and the law of marriage
of another, recognizes the law of the state granting the divorce. This
presents the question of the effect of such statutes when determined
by the courts of a state other than that passing the statute. In
general, it may be said that the same rules apply as where the domes-
tic court decides.
In New York a statute forbids the marriage of the guilty party to a
divorce action for adultery, during the lifetime of the other party.19
While a marriage within the state contrary to the prohibition has been
held void,20 and also to be bigamous,21 yet it has been held that a
marriage in a foreign state is valid on the ground that the legislature
did not intend that the statute should have any extra-territorial
effect.3 This rule has been applied where the foreign marriage was to
evade the statute5 and where the statute of the state where the mar-
riage was contracted provided that where either of the parties had a
"former husband or wife living" at time of such marriage, the same
would be invalid.4
There seems to be a tendency of the courts to hold statutes merely
prohibitory and doubtful of meaning, to be directory or to make the
marriage voidable, especially where the impediment is such as might
not have been known by both parties, and when public policy does not
dominate.25 Two conflicting aspects of public welfare confront the
courts in the interpretation of these statutes; one is that annulment
often affects the rights of innocent parties and bastardizes the issue,
while, on the other hand, to hold such a marriage valid abrogates the
whole effect of the statute. Where the former aspect has been present
in the first instance of interpretation of such. statutes, the courts
apparently have been influenced to hold that of the two, this phase of
public welfare dominated. In many jurisdictions, the issuepf invalid
marriages are legitimated by statute, and it would seem that in these
jurisdictions the tendency would be to hold the marriage invalid2 6
It seems hardly plausible that the legislatures intended nothing by
this legislation and the holding of some courts that such statutes are
intended to so restrict the effect of the decree of divorce as to make
one or both parties incapable of marriage, does not seem unreasonable.
Granting, as some courts do, that a marriage in violation of a
prohibitory statute is void, what extra-territorial effect shall such
statutes have? These statutes seem to be a valid attempt on the part
19Sec. 8 of Dom. Rel. Law, amended by Laws of 1915, Ch. 266, in effect Apr. 12,
I915, to allow remarriage of the parties to the divorce action. See sec. 1450 of
Penal Law for solemnization of unlawful marriage as a crime.20Cropsey v. Ogden, supra, note 4, holding also that the statute has retroactive
effect.2
'People v. Faber, supra, note 9.22Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18 (I88I). But see Earle v. Earle, 41 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 611 (i9IO).2 Thorp v. Thorp, 9o N. Y. 602 (1882).24Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521 (1883).26Schouler, Domestic Relations, sec. 14.2
'See L. R.A. 1916 C for cases under such statutes, and also Est.of Stull,supra,
note 18. But see State v. Yoder, supra, note 2, where marriage held voidable.
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of the legislatures to govern the marital status of its own citizens, but
it is difficult to see what value such legislation can have, if the parties
may merely go outside the state to marry. The rule laid down by an
English case that the forms of the marriage contract are governed by
the "lex loci contractus" and the essentials by the "lex domicilii",27
seems more logical, at least where the parties intend to return to the
domestic forum to live. As stated in an overruled New York case,28
"No other rule will enable a state to make its own laws of marriage
and divorce effectual and place the relation beyond the legislation of
others." On the other hand, without statutes to protect the innocent
victims of invalid marriages, much injustice will be done.
The doctrine of the Wisconsin case attacks the problem from the
view point of the foreign state and says a statute prohibiting the
remarriage of divorced persons becomes a part of every decree of
divorce granted in such state, and this being so, it should be given full
faith and credit in another state as any other judgment would be.
Then if such statute was determined by that state to make a marriage
contrary thereto void, it should be held so in all other jurisdictions.2
Ralph L. Emmons, 'i8.
Estoppel: Property left in the possession of another by the owner.
-In the case of Alexander v. Busch, 166 Pac. (Okla.) 9oo (1917), one
Smith executed and delivered to the Cushing State Bank his note and
chattel mortgage, Alexander signing as surety. In order to protect
his interests, Alexander took possession of the goods which are here
sought to be replevied by one Sanders, who had been the owner thereof
for a long time prior to the execution and delivery of the note and
mortgage. As it did not appear from the evidence that Sanders had
21Brook v. Brook, supra, note 16.
28Marshall v. Marshall, 2 Hun. (N. Y.) 238 (1874).
n"An Act On the Subject of Marriages in Another State or Country in Eva-
sion or Violation of the Laws of the State of Domicile," was approved by the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August, 1912, and rec-
ommended for adoption in all the states. It provides:
"Sec. i. Be it enacted, etc., That if any person residing and intending to con-
tinue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting mar-
riage under the laws of this state shall go into another state or country and
there contract a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of this state,
stch marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this state with the same
effect as though such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state.
"Sec. 2. No marriage shall be contracted in this state by a party residing and
intending to continue to reside in another state or jurisdiction if such marriage
would be void if contracted in such other state or jurisdiction and every marriage
celebrated in this state in violation of this provision shall be null and void."
Sec. 3 of the act puts certain restrictions upon the issuing of'marriage licenses
to parties mentioned in see. 2, and see. 4 provides penalties for violation of the
provisions of sec. 3, and also a penalty for one who knowingly celebrates such a
marriage.
This uniform act has been adopted by five states: Illinois, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Vermont and Wisconsin. It would seem that the Commissioners should
go a step further and recommend a statute protecting the rights of innocent
parties to such invalid marriages and children born of the same, since the inability
to reach this result by holding such marriages invalid, has apparently kept some
courts from laying down the doctrine codified in this statute.
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done anything more than merely leave the disputed property in the
possession and under the control of Smith, Sanders successfully main-
tained his suit, as these circumstances were deemed insufficient to
create an estoppel as against the true owner.
On the other hand, in W. P. Fuller & Co. v. Adams, x66 Pac.
(Wash.) 623 (I917), where a mother allowed her son to use personal
property in a business conducted in his own name, she was estopped
to claim the property was merely loaned to him as against a creditor of
the son. The creditor garnisheed the property in the hands of the
sheriff, the property in question remaining in the sheriff's hands at the
conclusion of chattel mortgage foreclosure proceeding, and it was held
that the creditor could reach the property in this way, though it
belonged to the mother.
It is clear law that the mere possession and control of personal
property in another than the owner thereof will not estop the true
owner from asserting his title as against a person who has dealt with
the possessor as owner on the faith of his possession.' Moreover, it is
immaterial that the person dealing with the one in possession may
have acted in good faith,2 for it has always been a fundamental doc-
trine that, in general, one cannot convey a better title to personal
property than that which he himself possesses, or, to quote from
Lemp Brewing Co. v. Mantz,3 "The application of the doctrine that
'whenever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of the
third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must
sustain it,' must be founded on something more than the bare posses-
sion of personal property * * * * "
A different proposition is presented, however, where the true owner
has clothed the person assuming to dispose of the property with the
apparent title to it. In such a case, the true owner is estopped to
assert the fact of his ownership as against one dealing in good faith
with the person in possession. 4
Such an estoppel was worked out as against the owner who left his
property in the possession of another for a period of a year, with
permission to use the same, and an innocent third party took a mort-
gage on the property. 5 Likewise, where the owner of a wagon per-
mitted the name and occupation of another to be painted on the wagon
and such other person sold the wagon to a purchaser acting in good
faith, he was not permitted to claim the property as against such
purchaser.6
It appears that two things must concur in order to create the afore-
mentioned estoppel, that is, (x) the owner must clothe the person
assuming to dispose of the property with apparent title to or authority
1io R. C. L. 777; Kershaw v. Merritt, I94 Mass. 113 (1907); Lemp Brewing
Co. v. Mantz, 120 Md. 176 (1913).2Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y. 456 (1874).3Supra, note I.
'National Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568 (1878); Avery & Sons v. Collins, 62
Tex. Civ. App. 313 (I9IO); Delfosse v. Metropolitan National Bank, 98 Ill. App.
123 (L9oI); Smith v. Clews, 105 N. Y. 283 (1887).5Davis v. Wewoka First National Bank, 6 Ind. Ter. 124 (i9o5).
'O'Connor v. Clark, 170 Pa. 318 (1895).
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to dispose of it, and (2) the person alleging the estoppel must have
acted and parted with value upon the faith of such apparent ownership
or authority, so that he will be the loser if the facts wherein he placed
his faith are not true. If these two elements are present, they are
sufficient to prevent the true owner from laying claim to what is
actually his own property.7
Mere possession of itself such as was present in Alexander v. Busch
is insufficient but possession coupled with the earmarks of ownership,
as in W. P. Fuller v. Adams, and the parting with value or the exten-
sion of credit by an innocent third person will always create an
estoppel against the true owner.
Olive J. Schmidt, 'i8.
Evidence: Presumptions: Survivorship in common disaster.-
The question as to the survivorship of persons who perish in a common
disaster was presented in Matter of Hammer, ioI Misc. (N. Y.) 351
(1917). The decedent, his wife and daughter, an infant, perished
when the steamship Lusitania was sunk on May 7, 1915. At the
time of his death the decedent carried two policies of insurance upon
his life. In each of these policies the insurance company promised to
pay the insured the amount of the policy, "or upon receipt * * * *
of due proof of the prior death of the insured, to his wife, the bene-
ficiary, with the right to the insured to change the beneficiary * * * *'"
If any beneficiary died before the insured, the interest of such bene-
ficiary was to vest in the insured. There was no evidence in the case
to show which of the persons was the survivor. The court held, that
there is no presumption of survivorship in a case where a number of
persons perish-in a common disaster, and declared, that the fact of
such survivorship is assumed to be unascertainable, and disposed of
the property rights as if death had occurred at the same time. The
court said, "As there is no evidence to prove such survivorship, and
as under the facts as stated there can be none, the death benefit must
be disposed of as though both husband and wife had died at the same
instant, in which event there was no interval between the death of the
husband and the wife during which the death benefit could have
vested in the wife." The personal representatives of the decedent
were awarded the amount of the policies.
When two or more persons perish in a common disaster or calamity,
practically all the common law authorities are agreed, that there is no
presumption that all died at once.' Nor is there a presumption that
one person or persons survived the others. 2  At the civil law there
were various presumptions of survivorship based on strength, age and
7Porter v. Parks, 49 N. Y. 564 (1872).
'Middekev. Balder, I98 Ill. 590 (1902); Russell v. Hallett, 23 Kans. 276 (I88o);
Johnson v. Merithew, 8o Me. i z I (1888); Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403 (1891);
Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78 (1878); Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. Cases 182 (186o).2Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U. S. 40, (1903); U. S. Cas-
ualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 3oi (1902); 51 L. R. A. 863, and cases there collected.
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sex. A few early English cases recognized such a doctrine,' and it is
still retained in California and Louisiana by statute.4
The question of survivorship when persons perish in a common
disaster arises most frequently in the distribution of property of a
decedent. In the first place, the courts have been confronted with
the problem where there are no written instruments involved. A
husband and wife may have perished together in the same disaster
and the question arises as to the distribution of the property of the
husband. According to the statutes in most states the wife is entitled
to a certain share of the husband's property. Now the representa-
tives of both the parties are striving for the property; the representa-
tives of the husband claiming that they are entitled to all of the
property because the wife never lived after the husband, and, there-
fore, no interest vested in her. On the other hand the representatives
of the wife claim a proportionate share of the property under the
statute. The decision depends upon the question of survivorship of
one or the other. If the wife died before the husband the representa-
tives of the wife will fail, while if the husband died before the wife the
representatives of the wife will get their statutory share of the
property. Professor Whittier, in an article on "Problems of Survivor-
ship" 5 has pointed out the correct solution of such a case, "Survivor-
ship must be proved by the party asserting it." The claimant upon
whom the burden of proof lies must establish his own chain of title
but he does not have to disprove the title of his opponent. In the
problem presented here the burden of proof would be upon the repre-
sentatives of the wife to show the survivorship of the wife. They will
be unable to discharge that burden and, therefore, will fail. Or the
case may be one in which the intestate and nearest of kin perished
together, the contest being between the representatives of the nearest
of kin and the representatives of the intestate.' In such a case the
burden of proof would be upon the representatives of the next of kin
to show the survival of the next of kin.
Secondly, the question of distribution under written instruments
is presented. The instruments most commonly involved are (i) wills,
and (2) insurance policies. In the construction of wills there is
frequently a preliminary problem of construction to be considered.
If the language of the will makes a gift to a legatee depend upon that
legatee surviving the testator or another, is the gift to the legatee
dependent upon the condition precedent of survivorship, or is there a
gift to him to be defeated only upon the happening of a condition
subsequent? Where the language of a specific gift is unambiguous,
construed in connection with the entire will, and is in form a condition
precedent, effect is given to such language, and in the absence of proof
3Taylor v. Diplock, 2 Phill. (Eng.) 261 (1815); In Matter of Selwyn, 3 Hagg.
Ec. (Eng.) 748 (1831).4Cal. Code 6f Civ. Proc., sec. 1963, sub. 4o; Civil Code of La., arts. 936-939.
516 Green Bag 237.
611i re Green's Settlement, L. R. i Eq. 288 (1865); Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 8i
(1857); Russell v. Hallett, supra, note I; Johnson v. Merithew, supra, note I;
Stinde v. Goodrich, 3 Red. Sur. (N. Y.) 87 (1877).
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of survivorship the gift will fail. In Wing v. Angrave,7 the property
was left by a wife to her husband, "and in case my said husband shall
die in my lifetime, to William Wing." Husband and wife perished
in the same shipwreck. This condition was construed literally by the
House of Lords, and it was decided that the prior death of the husband
was the only circumstance by which Wing could take the property,
and that the wife had provided for this circumstance alone. Wing
had to show the performance of the condition on which his title
depended, namely, the death of the husband in the wife's lifetime.
He was unable to prove the survivorship of the wife, and, therefore,
an intestacy was created. However, the United States Supreme
court has gone far toward the opposite result in order to prevent an
intestacy. In Young Women's Christian Home v. French,8 the testa-
trix disposed of her property first for the benefit of her husband and
son, adding, "in the event of my becoming the survivor of both my
husband * * * * and of my son * * * * I then give
* * * * all my property * * * * to the Young Women's
Home * * * *" The husband died first. The testatrix and
her son were lost in a steamer collision. The Home could not prove
the performance of the condition, literally interpreted. But the
court declared, that from the whole will, the intention of the testatrix
was to dispose of all her property and showed its desire to so construe
the instrument as not to create an intestacy. This case closely
approximates making a will for the testatrix, but if words creating a
condition precedent may reasonably be interpreted to mean a condi-
tion subsequent in a particular will, the result is logical and just.
This case has been generally followed in America. 9
Many of the courts, when confronted with the problem involved,
have decided that there is no presumption of survivorship or instan-
taneous death, but have disposed of property rights as though there
were.10  Their argument appears to be this: There is no presump-
tion that death occurred at the same time. Neither is there any
presumption to the contrary. But there exists a necessity of dispos-
ing of the property rights. In Newell v. Nichols" it was said, "It is
not impossible for two persons to die at the same time, and when
exposed to the same peril under like circumstances, it is not as a
question of probability very unlikely to happen. At most the differ-
ence can only be a few brief seconds. The scene passes at once
beyond the vision of human penetration, and it is as unbecoming as
it is idle for judicial tribunals to speculate or guess whether during
the momentary life struggle one or the other may not have ceased to
gasp first, especially when the transmission of property depends upon
it, and hence in the absence of other evidence the fact is a~sumed to
be unascertainable, and property rights are disposed of as if death
occurred at the same time." So the practical consequence is the
7Supra, note i8Supra, note 2.9Dunn v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 14i App. Div. (N. Y.) 478 (1910).
'
0Newell v. Nichols, supra, note i; Russell v. Hallett, supra, note i.
"Supra, note I.
THE CORATELL LAW QUARTERLY
same as if the law presumed all to have perished at the same moment.
Such an effect is attempted to be justified by some courts on the
ground that it is a "rule of distribution" and not a presumption of
fact. But the two do not differ.
In his article above referred to, Professor Whittier offered the
contentious method as a solution of all kinds of cases. In the ordin-
ary cases this method would apply very well, although the claimants
upon whom the burden of proof lay, would fail. But will this solve
a case where trustees under a will have brought a suit to have the will
construed, the only proof being offered by the trustees? Does the
burden of proof in such a case rest upon a claimant?
The second class of cases involving written instruments includes
contests over the proceeds of insurance policies, the insured and the
beneficiaries or some of them, having perished in the same disaster.
These cases have been dealt with by some courts in two different
respects; (i) where there is a right in the insured to change the
beneficiary, and (2) where there is no such right. Where there is no
right to change the beneficiary, the beneficiary gets a vested interest
in the contract when it is made.3 This vested right is subject, how-
ever, to be divested by the prior death of the beneficiary. The
representatives of the beneficiary have only to show the death of the
beneficiary, and their own survivorship, in order to be entitled to the
proceeds of the policy. The representatives of the irisured would
have to prove the survivorship of the insured in order to prove title.
But the principal case was decided as though there were a different
aspect of the case when the insured has reserved the right of changing
the beneficiary. It decided that no interest was vested in the
beneficiary, since there was a right to change that beneficiary, that
the beneficiary merely had a contingent interest; a mere expectancy.
Although this rule has been laid down in a number of cases,"3 and has
been followed by the text writers,14 it is submitted that the better
view is that the beneficiary should have a vested interest in the
policy, subject to be divested by the happening of certain conditions.
The view reached in the decisions cited can not be considered as
authority because it was not necessary for the result, there having
been a change of beneficiary in every case before the death of the
insured. And in Cowman v. Rogers,5 the Maryland court arrived at
the conclusion that the interest was a vested one, subject to be
divested. In that case the right to change the beneficiary had not
been exercised, so that it is analogous to the principal case. If the
rule of the Maryland court had been applied in the principal case the
representatives of the wife would have received the proceeds of the
policies.
William E. Vogel, '19.
2Cowman v. Rogers, supra, note 1; 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 980, and
cases there cited.
"Cited in 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 99o; also cases in Joyce on Insur-
ance, sec. 741.
'
4Joyce on Insurance, sec. 741; Vance on Insurance, sees. 135-136.
15Supra, note I.
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Evidence: Statutory prohibition against physicians giving evi-
dence: Construction of the New York Statute.-In Klein v. The Pru-
dential Insurance Co. of America, 221 N. Y. 449 (1917), the plaintiff
was suing as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy taken out by her
deceased husband. If the policy was to be held ineffective it was
necessary for the defendant to show that the deceased was in bad
health on February 14, 1913. The physician who attended the
deceased was allowed to testify that the deceased was sick at this
time and that he attended him. The plaintiff had also submitted to
the defendant a certificate of her husband's death in which she stated
that his illness began on February 12. He died on February 20. In
answer to the question as to the cause of his death the plaintiff referred
to a certificate of the attending physician which the plaintiff also sub-
mitted to the defendant company. The questions involved were as to
the admissibility of the doctor's testimony and his certificate.
The court, in affirming a verdict for the defendant, held that section
834 of the Code of Civil Procedure' did not render inadmissible the
simple statements of the doctor that he had attended the insured at a
certain time and at that time the insured was sick. In so holding the
court followed Patten v. United Life and Accident Insurance Associa-
tion,2 which is very clearly a precedent for such a decision.
In deciding that the doctor's certificate was admissible, the court
apparently considered that no question as to the scope and effect
of section 834 was presented. With reference to this phase of the
matter Judge Chase says, "Her [plaintiff's] reference therein [i. e.
in her own certificate] to the certificate of the hospital physician
made such certificate admissible in evidence as an admission against
her for what it was worth.2a If it appears therefrom to have been
based in whole or in part on hearsay evidence or on confidential -
communications made to him by the deceased and the plaintiff desired
to prevent its being considered in evidence, she should have objected
to it on that ground or have made a motion to strike it from the
record. The receipt of the proofs of death under the circumstances
disclosed by the record was not error." 3
The Court of Appeals has held in Davis v. The Knights of Labor4,
that section 834 extends to and renders inadmissible certificates as
to cause of death filed by attending physicians with the Board of
Health. It is submitted that in the principal case the court simply
decided that the question as to the effect of this section on the admis-
sibility of the physician's certificate was not properly presented and
that, even if it was error to admit the certificate, it was a harmless
"'A person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, or a professional or
registered nurse, shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired
in attending a patient, in a professional capacity and which was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity. * * *"
2133 N. Y. 450, 453 (1892).
2aIf evidence covered by section 834 takes the form of an admission it is admissi-
ble as such. Buffalo Loan and Trust Co. v. Knights Templar Assoc., 326 N. Y.
450 (1891).
3Klein v. Prudential Insurance Co., 221 N. Y. 449, 454 (i917).
4165 N. Y. 159 (I90).
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error and not such as would warrant reversal. The court indicates
this when it says, "In any case the evidence that the applicant was
sick on the day before he was taken to the hospital appears almost, if
not entirely, beyond controversy by testimony other than that of the
attending physician."I
To bring a case within the provisions of section 834 the existence of
the relation of physician and patient must appear, the information
sought to be excluded must have been obtained as a result of this
relationship, and the objection must be made at the time the evidence
is offered and should be based specifically upon -hc provisions of this
section.
It must be determined from the facts in each particular case whether
the relation of physician and patient there existed. The chief con-
sideration is whether the person to whom the information related
believed, and had reason to believe, that he was confiding as patient to
a physician.6 When one who is sick unto death is in fact treated,
even against his will, by a physician he becomes the patient of that
physician.7 The same nile applies in the case of a man who is uncon-
scious or unable to speak for himself. The fact that the information
related to a person not a party to the action at bar does not take it
out of the statute.8 The burden of showing that the relation of
patient and physician existed is upon the one making objection to the
evidence.9
The courts have not limited the operation of this section strictly
to that information gained by the physician which was "necessary
for him to act in that capacity," but have, in effect, excluded all
information as to the physical condition of the patient obtained as a
result of the professional relationship. 10 It is not necessary that the
information be conveyed to the physician by word of mouth. The
statute applies to what the physician observes, no matter how promin-
ent and noticeable the particular physical characteristics of the
patient may be." The physician may, however, testify as to the
physical condition of a former patient, but such testimony must be
based wholly on the information gained subsequent to the time when
the relation of patient and physician existed." The burden is upon
the party objecting to show that the information in question was
5Supra, note 3.
'People v. Murphy, ioi N. Y. 126 (1886); People v. Sliney, 137 N. Y. 570
(1893); People v. Hoch, i5o N. Y. 291 (1896); People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355(1897); People v. Kemmler, II9 N. Y. 58o (189o).
Meyer v. Knights of Pythias, 178 N. Y. 63 (19o4).
SMatter of Myer, 184 N. Y. 54 (1906); Edington v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
67 N. Y. 185 (1876).
9People v. Schuyler, 1o6 N. Y. 298 (1887).
"0Nelson v. Village of Oneida, x56 N. Y. 2-19 (1898); Renihan v. Dennin, io3
N. Y. 573 (1886).
"Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281 (188o); Grattan v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 274 (1883); Edington v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co.,.67 N. Y. 185 (1876); Dilleber v. Home Life Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 256 (1877).
12Edington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564 (1879); Fisher v. Fisher, 129
N. Y. 654 (1892); People v. Austin, i99 N. Y. 446 (i9io).
NOTES AND COMMENT
obtained by the physician while professionally attending the person
to whom the matter relates. 3
Objection to the admission in evidence of confidential information
confided by a patient to a physician should not be based upon any
general ground but counsel should specify that he is resting his
objection upon the provisions of section 834.14 The reason for this
appears to be that the prohibition is wholly statutory. At common
law a physician could testify as to confidential information given him.
It has been held that where matter coming within section 834 has
been admitted without objection the question of its competency can-
not be raised by a motion to strike it out. 5 The objection should be
made at the time the evidence is offered.
The statute applies to both civil and criminal cases. In actions to
invalidate a will it can be used to prevent physicians who have
attended the testator from testifying as to his capacity to make a
will." In an action by a physician against a patient to collect fees,
the physician can testify only as to the making of the contract for
services and cannot describe the patient's physical condition or go
into detail in any way in regard to the services rendered. 7 The
statute is used widely in actions on insurance policies where the
physical condition of the insured at a certain time is a question in
issue. In an action for damages for personal injuries the plaintiff
may use the section to prevent the examination of -physicians who
have attended him.'8 If the physician is called as a witness for the
plaintiff, either in the same trial or in a former trial of the same cause
of action, that constitutes a waiver of the provisions of section 834.' 9
If plaintiff has been examined by more than one physician and calls
one of them as a witness, that constitutes a waiver as to the other
physicians. 20  If, however, the physicians examined the plaintiff at
different times the calling of one is not a waiver as to the others.21
The statute does not, however, prevent the physician from relating
information where such information does not refer to the plaintiff's
physical condition, but to the manner and cause of the accident.22
"Griffiths v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., I7I N. Y. io6 (1902); Patten v.
United Life and Accident Assoc., 133 N. Y. 450 (1892); People v. Austin, supra,
note I2; People v. Schuyler, supra, note 9.
14Hoyt v. Hoyt, 112 N. Y. 493 (1889).
1.Supra, note 14. See also People v. Bloom, 193 N. Y. I (19o8); where it was
held that testimony of a physician not objected to when the patient was plaintiff
in a civil action for damages for personal injuries could not be objected to when
patient was being tried on an indictment for perjury.
"
6Renihan v. Dennin, IO3 N. Y. 573 (1886); Matter of Coleman, iii N. Y. 220(1888); Loderv. Whelpley, iii N. Y. 239 (1888); Matter of Myer, 184 N. Y. 54(i9o6); Matter of Newcomb, 192 N. Y. 238 (19o8).
'
7MacEvitt v. Maass, 64 App. Div. (N. Y.) 382 (1901).
'
8Feeneyv. Long Island R. R. Co., Ii6 N. Y. 375 (1889); Sloan v. N.Y. Central
R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 125 (1871); Jones v. Brooklyn, B. & W. E. R. R. Co., 3 N. Y.
Sup. 253 (1888), aff'd without opinion 121 N. Y. 683 (1890).
"9McKiney v. Grand Street, P. P. & F. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 352 (x887).
2°Morris v. N. Y. 0. & W. R. R. Co., 148 N. Y. 88 (1895).
2Barker v.'Cunard Steamship Co., 91 Hun (N. Y.) 495 (1895), aff'd without
opinion 157 N. Y. 693 (1898).
'Green v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 171 N. Y. 201 (1902).
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In applying section 834 to criminal cases the most troublesome
situations arise when the state sends a physician to examine the
accused as to his sanity or condition in other respects. If it can be
shown that the relation of physician and patient arose between the
state physician and the accused then the statute may be used to
prevent the physician from giving the results of his examination.2
In murder cases the physician who attended the deceased just before
his death may give the results of his examination of the deceased.2
Where the patient himself is a witness he can no more be compelled
to disclose confidential information than can the physician.26 The
provisions of section 834 may be waived in accordance with the
provisions of section 836 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Harry H. Hoffnagle, '17.
Husband and Wife: Alienation of affections: Plaintiff's husband
the pursuing party.--Where a wife brings action against another
woman for alienating the affections of the plaintiff's husband, is it a
necessary part of the cause of action that the defendant shall have
done some affirmative act tending to alienate the affections of the
husband? This question is answered in the affirmative in the case of
Loper v. Askin, 178 App. Div. (N. Y.) 163 (1917). It must appear, in
the language of the court, "that the woman defendant was the
pursuer, not merely the pursued. She does not become liable because
she may have accepted the admiration of plaintiff's husband."'
This view is clearly the one supported by New York authority,2 and
has been adopted by the great majority of courts in which the ques-
tion has arisen,3 on the theory that the defendant should not be
blamed for the husband's wrongful act.
A different view was taken in the case of Hart v. Knapp.4 In that
case, which was an action for the alienation of the affections of the
plaintiff's husband, it was shown that the defendant had been guilty
of adultery with the husband. The defendant was held liable for
alienation of affections, even although the husband was the seducer.
This position has also been taken by Vermont.5 The theory upon
which these cases were decided seems to be that there are two grounds
upon which an action for alienation of affections may be maintained;
first, for alienation by persuasion or allurement, in which case loss of
consortium must be proved; second, for alienation by adultery, in
nSupra, note 6.2 Piersonv. People, 79 N. Y. 424 (188o).25Dambmann v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 55 Misc. (N. Y.) 6o (1907).
'At p. 164.2Warnerv. Miller, 17Abb. N. C. (N.Y.) 22I (1885); Churchillv. Lewis, 17Abb.
N. C. (N. Y.) 226 (1886); Buchanan v. Foster, 23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 542 (2897);
Whitman v. Egbert, 27 App. Div. (N. Y.) 374 (1898).
3Waldron v. Waldron, 45 Fed. 15 (189o); Ash v. Prunier, IO5 Fed. 722 (I9I);
Scott v. O'Brien, 129 Ky. I (igo8); DeFordv. Johnson, 152 Mo. App. 209 (1911);
McKenna v. Algeo, 51 Atl. (N. J.) 936 (1902); Stewart v. Hagerty, 251 Pa. 603(1916).
476 Conn. 135 (1903).5Miller v. Pearce, 86 Vt. 322 (I913).
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which case loss of consortium is conclusively presumed.6  This latter
ground practically amounts to allowing the wife to maintain an
action for criminal conversation, which is not generally permitted.
7
It is only on this ground that the view of Hart v. Knapp can be
explained; yet the court in that case expressly refused to decide the
latter question, declaring that a distinction existed between the two
cases.
Were actions by the wife for criminal conversation allowed, it
would seem that the view in Hart v. Knapp would be correct; for it
has been held that the fact that the wife was the persuading party is
no defense to an action for criminal conversation brought by the
husband,8 though it may serve to mitigate damages.9 The gist of
such action is the defilement of the marriage bed and it would make
no difference who the persuading party was. But if the action is for
alienation of affections, the same rule should not be applied; for if the
defendant has done no act to steal away the love of the plaintiff's
spouse, there is no wrongful act upon which an action may be based;
this would be true, whether the husband or wife was plaintiff. There
might be adultery without alienation of affections. 10
- It would appear, therefore, that the view of the principal case is
correct, and that the result in the cases taldng the other view has been
reached through a confusion of the action for alienation of affections
with the action for criminal conversation.
Richard H. Brown, 'i9.
Insurance: Mutual Benefit Companies: Right to amend by-laws.
-The question as to the right of a mutual benefit insurance company
to amend its by-laws has again been litigated in the case of Tusant
et al v. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W., 163 N. W. (Ia.) 69o (1917). The
plaintiffs had been members of the defendant order for over thirty
years. In 1911, in order to put the association upon a substantial
basis, an amendment to the by-laws was passed, dividing the member-
ship into two classes, the younger members of the order being included
in Class B and the older men in Class A. Class B was placed upon a
self-paying basis and at the same time the rate of assessment for those
in Class A was raised and the members required to pay their own death
losses without aid from the younger members of the order. In igi6,
those of the older men who remained were peremptorily required by
another amendment to either maintain their insurance by paying the
Class B rate for men of their age, or to continue to pay the same
assessment but submitting to a scaling down of their certificate to an
amount commensurate with such rate as shown by the mortality
tables. The plaintiffs refused to obey the amendment, and in a suit
to enjoin its enforcement, the court, conceding the right to make
6Miller v. Pearce, supra, note 5, at p. 328.
76 Ann. Cas. 665, and cases there cited.8See cases cited in Hart v. Knapp, supra, note 4, at p. 140.
gHoggins v. Coad, 58 Ill. App. 58 (1895); Ferguson v. Smethers, 70 Ind. 589
(88o); Siebbr v. Pettit, 200 Pa. 58 (1goi).
10This seems to be recognized in a later Vermont case, Nieberg v. Cohen, 88 Vt.
281, 287 (1914).
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reasonable amendments and regulations to preserve the life of the
order, held the association to be without power to make such an
amendment as the one in question, and, therefore, the action of
the defendant in purporting to deny to the plaintiffs the benefits
of a going concern and of new membership was a violation of their
"substantial rights."
The decision was undoubtedly correct, and, although upon the
same facts there would seem to belittle conflict, it presents the problem
as to when such organizations may change, in respect to the increase
of assessments or decrease of benefits, their contractual obligations as
evidenced by their constitution, by-laws and certificate of insurance.
Whether or not there is an express reservation of the right to change
and amend the by-laws, it is generally conceded that a mutual benefit
association may enact such by-laws as are reasonably necessary for
the government and regulation of the order.' But where the contract
contains a general reservation of the power to change and amend, the
cases are in great conflict as to just how far such a reservation extends.
In Thomas v. Knights of Maccabees,2 the certificate contained the
provision that the member "will comply with the laws of the order
now in force or that may hereafter be adopted," and also a clause to
the effect that the rate of assessment would not be changed as long
as the plaintiff was a member in good standing. The rate was later
raised and suit was begun to enjoin its collection. The Supreme
Court of Washington held that such a change could be made under the
general reservation, remarking that "there being no contract in the
commercial sense, but a mutual promise of every member to pay the
certificate of every other member, there can be no vested right in any
provision of the contract, either express or implied, that is not subject
to and controlled by the duty of the member to pay the cost of his
own insurance, for under no construction of a mutual contract can
he demand more than he is willing to give." And in the Massa-
chusetts case of Reynolds v. Royal Arcanum,3 where the same general
reservation was made, and a subsequent amendment was adopted
increasing the assessment, or at the member's option, reducing the
benefits, the court held that the association could amend its by-laws
in a reasonable way to accomplish the purposes for which the associa-
tion was organized. The United States Supreme Court,4 in con-
sidering whether a similar change was an impairment of the contract,
held that it was not, being necessary for the continuance of the com-
pany, and because "there was no vested right to a continuation of a
plan of insurance which experience might demonstrate would result
disastrously to the company and its members." The majority of the
cases5 seem to be in accord with the rule of the cases referred to above,
1Niblack on Mutual Benefit Societies, sec. xi; Bacon, Life and Accident
Insurance, sec. i15.
285 Wash. 665 (1915).
3192 Mass. 15o (19o6).
4Wright v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 657 (1904).5Schmierer v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 153 Cal. 208 (19o8); Fullen-
wider v. Supreme Council, R. L., 18o Ill. 621 (1899); Champion v. Hannahan,
138 Ill. App. 387 (19o8); Williams v. Supreme Council, C. M. B., 152 Mich. i
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to the effect that a general reservation of the power to change and
amend the by-laws does authorize a subsequent change, in respect to
assessments and benefits, which may be reasonably necessary to carry
out the purposes of the association.
There are cases, however, which hold differently.6  In a recent
Texas case,7 where the assessments were increased, the court con-
sidered this to be a violation of the contract, upon the ground that
"the reservation * * * * of the general power to amend its
constitution and by-laws * * * *, relates only to the member's
duties and obligations as such, and does not authorize a radical change
in the terms of his insurance contract as was attempted to be made by
the raised assessments. This being true, it is immaterial that the
appellee may have occupied the position of insured and insurer, and
whether the increase in the rate of appellee's assessments was reason-
able or necessary to continue the financial existence of the corpora-
tion."
In New York, in the much cited case of Wright v. Knights of
Maccabees,8 there was a general reservation and a provision that the
plaintiff should continue to pay at the same rate as long as he was a
member in good standing, simila to the provision in the Thomas case.
The right to pay at the old rate was held to be a vested right, immune
from change by amendment, in the absence of a specific reservation to
that effect. The question was submitted again to the Court of
Appeals in the case of Green v. Royal Arcanum.' At the time Green
joined the defendant order, his rate of assessment was $i.86 per
month. In 1898, it was raised to $3.16, to which the plaintiff con-
sented. Seven years later, the assessment was again raised to $6.87
per month, and for some time Green paid under protest. In i91o, he
tendered $3.16, the amount to which he had assented, and which
amount the defendant refused to accept. Green then sued to enjoin
his suspension from the order, and the court held that a general reser-
vation of the right to amend does not authorize a subsequent increase
of the rate of assessment or reduction of the amount of benefits as
fixed by the contract.
It is difficult to find a principle upon which the cases may be
reconciled, other than that the change must be a reasonable one.
Under the Washington view, as illustrated by the Thomas case, it
would seem that any change would be reasonable if necessary to
sustain the life and carry out the purposes of the order. Other cases
hold that the change is reasonable, only when it does not impair the
contract by infringing a substantial, or as some courts call it, "vested"
(19o8); Trisler v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 Mo. App. 497 (1907);
Conner v. Supreme Commandery, G. C., II7 Tenn. 549 (I9O6); United Benevo-
lent Ass'n v. Cass, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 628 (19o9); Knights of Pythias v. Mims,
241 U. S. 574 (1916).6Smythe v. Supreme Lodge, K. P., 198 Fed. 967 (1912); Ericson v. Supreme
Ruling, F. M. C., 105 Tex. 170 (1912); Pearson v. Knight Templars, I14 Mo.
App. 283 (1905); Strauss v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 N. C. 465
(igoI); Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Mims, 167 S. W. (Tex.) 835 (1914).7Ericson v. Supreme Ruling, F. M. C., supra, note 6.
8x96 N. Y. 391 (1909).
92o6 N. Y. 591 (1912).
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right which the member has by virtue of his certificate and the
original constitution and by-laws.
But, assuming that there has been an unauthorized change and,
upon the refusal of the member to abide by it, a repudiation of the
contract by the company, can the member maintain an action to
recover damages as for a breach of the contract? Ordinarily, the
absolute repudiation of a contract before the time for its performance
gives an immediate right of action for damages.' 0 In a number of the
states recognizing this doctrine of anticipatory breach, it is applied as
well to contracts of mutual benefit insurance as to any other con-
tracts." But in New York and a few other states,12 it has been held
that the doctrine of anticipatory breach does not apply to contracts
of this nature. In Kelly v. Security Mutual Life Insurance Co.,3 the
New York court held that the plaintiff had no right to sue for damages
before the time for performance by the defendant arrived. It was
stated that the doctrine of anticipatory breach was confined in this
state to contracts of a special character only, the court saying that
"at least we have not extended it to mutual life insurance policies,
perhaps for the reason that the question of fact opened to unscrupu-
lous persons by such extension might undermine the solvency of the
company and inflict gross injustice upon the other policy holders."
This quotation, perhaps, explains the decision of the case, as the Court
of Appeals has recognized the doctrine -of anticipatory breach in
various cases of a different nature,14 and, if the dictum in an early case'5
is correct, would apply the doctrine of anticipatory breach to a case
of repudiation by an old line insurance company of a similar policy of
life insurance.
Although a few of the courts 6 recognize an increase in the assess-
ment rate, or reduction of the amount payable under the certificate,
as an unreasonable amendment, and therefore a breach of the contract
such as to justify an immediate action for damages, the majority of
jurisdictions avoid this result,--some courts by holding the change a
reasonable one, and, therefore, no breach; others, by holding that,
even though the change is unreasonable, the doctrine of anticipatory
breach does not apply to actions upon contracts of this nature. The
states which adopt this latter view, however, do allow an application
to a court of equity for the reinstatement of the policy.
W. J. Gilleran, '18.
1
°Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1 (1899).
"Fort v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 123 N. W. (Ia.) 224 (1909); Makely v. Supreme
Council, A. L. H., I33 N. C. 367 (1903); O'Niell v. Supreme Council, A. L. H.,
7o N. J. L. 42o (2904); Conner v. Supreme Commandery, G. C., supra, note 5;
Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Mims, supra, note 6; Supreme Council, A. L. H. v.
Black, 123 Fed. 65o(1903); Supreme Council, A. L. H. v. Lippincott, 134 Fed.
824 (195o).12Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Knight, 227 Ind. 489 (1888); Kelly v. Security
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 186 N. Y. 16 (29o6); Porter v. Supreme Council,
A. L. H., x83 Mass. 326 (i9o3).
uS-upra, note 12.14Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246 (2870); Howard v. Daly, 6i N. Y. 362
(2875); Ferris v. Spooner, 102 N. Y. io (1886); Windmuller v. Pope, 207 N. Y.
674 (887); Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co. J37 N. Y. 472 (1893).
uPeople v. Security Life Ins. and Annuity Co., 78 N. Y. 114, 125 (1879).
"See note II,'supra.
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Nuisance: Right to enjoin construction of theatre and bowling
alley.-InHamilton Corporationv. Julian, iox AtI. (Md.) 558 (1917), the
defendant was erecting two buildings in a residential neighborhood,
one to be used as a bowling alley, the other as a moving picture theatre.
An injunction was granted against the completion of the buildings, it
being held that they would be nuisances when completed. The rule
followed is that where it can be plainly seen that acts, when completed,
will certainly result in a grievous nuisance, and that irreparable
injury will follow, the court will interpose.' The present case is
considerably weaker than those cited in its support,2 in four of which
the defendant was establishing a manufactory with its attendant
odors, smoke and the like, and in the other of which the defendant was
raising fowls, dogs, and hogs on his premises.
The court in applying the rule to this case, says that bowling alleys
and moving pictures, kept and conducted for profit, are not nuisances
per se, but that they may become so in certain places when they create
disturbance to the serious annoyance and physical discomfort of
persons of ordinary sensibilities living in the neighborhood.
Although the common law view was for a time that a bowling alley
was a nuisance per se,3 the modem view is clearly settled otherwise.4
The question more recently has arisen as to whether it may be a
nuisance because of its locality, and the few decisions have not been
altogether harmonious. In Pape v. Pratt' the bowling alley was
already established, and the evidence tended to show that it was
improperly conducted. The court held that this bowling alley was a
nuisance. In a Massachusetts case6 it was held that the defendant
could carry on the business under a license, and that such license
afforded full protection if its terms were complied with, although the
plaintiff was admittedly disturbed. The terms of the license com-
pelled the use of certain noise deadening cushions. The Illinois case7
cited in the principal case enjoined the defendant from operating a
bowling alley already established, both because it was an extension of
a saloon, which brought it within a prohibited distance of a church,
and because it was proven that the plaintiff was seriously disturbed.
This is no more than authority that bowling alleys may become
nuisances by reason of their conduct and their location. In Shreveport
v. Leiderkrantz Society s it was held that a bowling alley was not a
nuisance per se, and here, being properly conducted, it was not a
nuisance even though in a residential district.
'Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123 (z873).2Dittman v. Repp, 5o Md. 516 (1878); Chappell v. Funk, 57 Md. 465 (i88i);
The Fertilizer Company v. Spangler, 86 Md. 562 (1898); Hendricksonv. Standard
Oil Company, 126 Md. 577 (1915); Singer v. James, i3o Md. 382 (r917).3Rex v. Hall, 2 Keb. (Eng.) 846 (1671); State v. Haines, 3o Me. 65 (1849).
'Harrison v. People, ioi Ill. App. 224 (1902); Bloomhuff v. State, 8 Blackf.
(Ind.) 205 (1846); State v. Hall, 32 N. J. L. 158 (1867); State v. Noyes, 30 N. H.
279 (1855); Papev. Pratt Inst. 127 App. Div. (N. Y.) 147 (19o8).
'Supra, note 4.
*Levin v. Goodwin, 191 Mass. 341 (i9o6).7Harrison v. People, supra, note 4.
sShreveport v. Leiderkrantz Society, 13o La. 8o2 (1912).
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The case in hand is the first case in which a theatre as such has been
enjoined as a private nuisance. At common law it was held that
playhouses, having been introduced with the laudable design of
recommending virtue, and exposing vice and folly, were not nuisances
per se, although they could become so through mismanagement. 9
It is probably because the success of such an enterprise depends to a
large extent upon its popularity in the neighborhood that no cases
have arisen prior to this. The case most similar is that of a school-
house. In Harrison v. Good,'0 the defendants were about to erect a
schoolhouse in a residential district, and the plaintiff prayed for an
injunction. The judge acknowledged the fact that it would be
detrimental to the value of the plaintiff's property, but held that it
was not a legal nuisance. Insomuch as blacksmith shops may be
compared with theatres and bowling alleys the cases which have arisen
concerning them are contra to the principal case." In the case of
Morris v. Roberson" a blacksmith shop located in a residential section
was not enjoined, the court saying, "If a blacksmith shop is not per se
a nuisance, then it must follow that, if it is operated as blacksmith
shops ordinarily are, a nuisance is not created by the operation,
because, if the ordinary operation of a blacksmith shop creates a
nuisance, of necessity it results that such shop in itself is a nuisance."
Such a rule is too broad. It could be equally applied to theatres and
bowling alleys, and would nullify the effect of location upon the
question of what constitutes a nuisance.
The test of a nuisance would seem to be whether the act complained
of constitutes a reasonable use of one's property, which is determined
by the injury to the plaintiff in the ordinary enjoyment of his property
and the benefit to other people.3 An injunction restraining the
carrying on of a legitimate and lawful business should go no further
than is necessary to protect the rights of the parties seeking the
injunction.14 The benefit to other people here is obvious. Both
moving picture theatres and bowling alleys are a legitimate means of
affording recreation and enjoyment to a large numrnber of the public.
In themselves they are free from any taint of immorality, and aside
from the recreative feature, afford a material benefit, the one educat-
ing the mind of the public, the other the physical body. To be
weighed with this is the alleged injury to the plaintiff. The only
thing which would seem to make either enterprise a nuisance is noise
or disturbance. Conceding that either one may be conducted in
such a manner as to render it a nuisance, it is a question of fact as to
9People v. Baldwin, i Wheel Cr. (N. Y.) 279 (x823); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown, (7th ed.) 145.
10Harrison v. Good, ii L. R., Eq. Cas. (Eng.) 338 (187).
"Chambers v. Cramer, 49 W. Va. 395 (i9O1); Morris v. Roberson, 137 Ky. 841
(191O).
2Supra, note I i.
13This is not to say that after a nuisance is once determined there should be a
balancing of injury and benefit so as to deternine whether or not to enjoin it.
The.weight of authority is to the contrary. 5 Pomeroy, (3d Ed.) Equity Juris-
prudence, sec. 53o; Whalen v. Union Bag and Paper Co., 2o8 N. Y. 1 (1913);
Hard v. The Blue Points Co., 17o App. Div. (N. Y.) 524 (1915).14Chamberlain v. Douglas, 24 App. Div. (N. Y.) 582 (1898).
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how much noise or other manner of nuisance it did make. Until the
completion and operation such facts do not become apparent and are
impossible of proof. There may be ground for a holding that a cer-
tain amount of noise is unavoidably incident to a bowling alley, so as
to determine what the effect of this particular bowling alley will be,
but the decision in Shreveport v. Leiderkrantz Society, supra, casts
considerable doubt upon the correctness of such a holding. No such
noise could be held to be necessarily incident to a moving picture
theatre, however. The only other injury conceivable from well con-
ducted establishments is that to the plaintiff's pride in knowing that a
commercial proposition is being conducted near his residence. Such
injury should not be taken into account.
If there were circumstances not appearing in the report which
afforded special opportunities of knowledge as to what the result of
such building will be, the holding may be sustained, but under
principle the rule can hardly be said to be that such enterprises con-
stitute nuisances per se, whenever erected in a residential district,
however exclusive in character.
L. W. Dawson, '19.
Partnership: Right of managing partner to compensation.-In
Rains v. Weiler, 166 Pac. 235 (x917), the Kansas court held that a
managing partner could recover his claim for salary beyond his share
of the profits, on an implied contract.
Whether a managing partner is entitled to extra compensation has
been the subject of much controversy and litigation. In theory, the
law is more or less well established as follows: If there is a contract,
by the terms of which the managing partner is to be allowed a stipu-
lated sum for his services, the transaction is governed by the ordinary
law of contract;' in the absence of such an agreement one partner is
not entitled, in law or in equity, to extra compensation for his services
and time while employed in the partnership business.2 The reasons
as stated by the courts for not allowing recovery in these latter cases
are several: that the law never undertakes to measure and settle
between partners their various and unequal services in the transaction
of the firm affairs, as the attempt would be impracticable; that each
partner in taking care of the joint property is caring for his own
interest and performing his own duties and obligations, implied in,
and constituting a part of the consideration for the others to engage in
the partnership; that one partner may have advantages over another
partner in one respect, as he may have numerous and powerful friends
and the confidence of his' fellow citizens to a high degree, while
another partner may have advantages in another respect, as wisdom
and sagacity in directing the general management of affairs and tact
'Paine v. Thacher, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 450, (1841); Lassiter v. Jackman, 88 Ind.
iI8 (1882); Strattan v. Tabb, 8 Ill. App. 225 (i88i); Weaver v. Upton, 29 N. C.
458 (1847).
2Heath v. Waters, 40 Mich. 457 (1879); Ligare v. Peacock, 109 Ill. 94 (1884);
McBride v. Stradley, 1O3 Ind. 465 (1885); Cameron, et al. Admin. v. Francisco,
26 Oh. St. 19o (1875); Smith v. Brown, 44W. Va. 342 (1898).
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as a salesman; that it is the duty of partners to devote themselves to
the interests of the firm, no partner having the right to engage in any
business which must necessarily deprive the partnership of a portion
of his skill, industry, or capital, all of which he is bound to devote to
the partnership. He is not, however, c6mpelled to devote all of his
time personally to the concern if there is no such agreement in the
articles of partnership. A further reason is that the law presumes in
the absence of agreement for compensation that each partner relies
on the profit arising from his interest in the partnership business for
his compensation.
In those cases in which the contract for a salary is express the
decisions are uniform, but there is no uniformity as to the conditions
under which a contract may be implied.
There is no express contract in the principal case, and the question
arises as to what facts or conduct are sufficient to constitute an implied
contract. Where one partner is requested or appointed by the others
to act as manager, although no mention of salary is made, it has been
held that a compensation is necessarily and equitably implied, and the
other partners are considered as dealing with a stranger, the managing
partner acting as an agent amd not as a partner.3 In cases where there
is no request by the other partners, and one member of the partnership
acts as manager and later demands that .he be paid for his services
difficulty arises. The general rule is that there can be no recovery,4
and this is true in case of services rendered in the winding up of the
partnership.5 Where, however, the difference in extent or importance
of services actually rendered by the various partners was not clearly
contemplated by them when they entered into the partnership
relation,6 or where services rendered were special services, that is,
those not generally performed by a partner, such as acting as a g6neral
clerk in a store,7 or where, in winding up the affairs, the surviving
partner renders services not strictly in settlement, compensation is
allowed, although there was no agreement." There is a tendency to
allow extra compensation wherever it is possible to construe the
services as extraordinary.9 Some courts hold that where the other
partners know and consent to one partner acting as manager, he can
recover salary for such service.10 The relation is sometimes considered
one of agency.
If one partner is to give his services in lieu of furnishing original
capital or money for partnership purposes, undoubtedly that partner
should not be allowed compensation fdr those services. In a Missouri
3Bradford v. Kimberly, 3 Johns Ch. (N. Y.) 431 (1818); Lewis v. Moffett, ii
Ill. 392 (1849).4Williams v. Pederson, ef. at., 47 Wash. 472 (x9o7); Lindsey v. Stranahan, 129
Pa. 635 (1889); see note 2, supra.
"Brown's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 139 (1879); Dunlap v. Watson, 124 Mass. 3o5
(1878); Coursen v. Hamlin, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 513 (1853).
6Miller v. Hale, 96 Mo. App. 427 (1902).
'7Godfrey v. White, 43 Mich. 171 (I880).
'Schenkl v. Dana, II8 Mass. 236 (1875).
gThayerv. Badger, 171 Mass. 279 (1898); Zell's Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 329 (1889);
Humphreys v. Hurtt, 2o Hun. (N. Y.) 398 (188o).
1°Levi v. Karrick, 13 Ia. 344 (1862).
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case, the court allowed recovery by one partner where the agreement
was originally of that character, but one partner actually furnished
labor to a greater value than the amount of capital put in by the
others.'! Where each contribute the same initial amount, and all
equally meet any contingent expenses, and one partner manages the
entire partnership business, the others doing nothing, although the
courts do not allow recovery, it seems that the managing partner
should be remunerated. If the courts thought the equities of the case
warranted recovery (for quasi contract is nothing more than equitable
relief in law courts) they could allow him to recover as on a promise
implied in law.
The court in the principal case allows recovery on the ground that
there was an implied contract, but in the opinion there is no hint as
to what circumstances the court considered sufficient to constitute
this implied contract, except, however, that it was a custom among
miners in that district to give compensation where some of the part-
ners in a project of this character devoted their entire time and effort
to the business, while others took no part in it.
New York follows the general rule of allowing the managing partner
compensation only where there is an agreement express or implied,
or the services may be considered extraordinary.12 The general rule
that there can be no recovery of salary for acting in the partnership
business has been enacted in the Uniform Partnership Act, which has
been adopted in a number of the states.13
Jane M. G. Foster, 'x8.
Principal and Agent: Revocation of authority: Recovery of com-
missions.-In Braniff v. Bair, 165 Pac. (Kan.) 816 (17), an owner
of realty gave a broker an exclusive agency to continue until Oct. i
to effect a sale of such realty. The broker spent time and money in
efforts to find a purchaser, but before he had found one, the owner
withdrew the land from sale, and notified the agent. Shortly there-
after, and before Oct. i, the broker procured a purchaser. The
agent sued for his commissions. It was held that the owner was
liable. The court said: "The general trend of authorities is that, if
the agent proceeds in good faith to comply with the terms of the
proposal oz agreement like the one in question by advertising the
property and spending time and effort to find a purchaser, these acts
amount to an acceptance, and thereafter both parties are bound."
On principle an offer of a promise for an act can only be accepted,
in a manner giving rise to a binding contract, by doing the very act
'Gaston v. Kellogg, 91 Mo. 104 (1886).
nfBradford v. Kimberly, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 431 (1818); Gilhoolyv. Hart, el al.,
8 Daly (N. Y.) 176 (1878); Caldwell v. Leiber, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 483 (1839);
Coursen v. Hamlin, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 513 (1853); Franklin v. Robinson, i Johns.
Ch. (N. Y.) T58 (1814); Lyon v. Snyder, 6i Barb. (N. Y.) 172 (187); Evans v.
Warner, 2o App. Div. (N. Y.) 230 (1897);
13Uniform Partnership Act, sec. 18 (f): "No partner is entitled to remuneration
for acting in the partnership business, except that a surviving partner is entitled
to reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs."
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called for by the offer. Thus in Biggers v. Owen' a reward was offered
for apprehending a criminal and procuring evidence sufficient to
convict him. The plaintiff apprehended him, but did not get evidence
sufficient to convict. The offer of a reward was then withdrawn.
After such withdrawal the plaintiff went ahead and procured the
necessary evidence. But it was held that he was not entitled to the
reward, since the offerors could revoke the offer at any time before it
was accepted. A part performance of the acts called for was not
sufficient to bind the promisors. The same principle applies to the
offer of a commission by a principal to an agent upon the doing of an
act.
2
It is inevitable that a strict application of this principle will often
result in great hardship. Professor Ashley puts the following case:
"A desires his safe moved from his old office to a new one. He asks B
to do this act, and says he will pay him $25. When the safe has been
carried to the door of the new building, A appears and tells B that he
withdraws his offer, directing him to leave the safe there. Neverthe-
less B proceeds and completes the moving."3  On what theory can A
be held? He cannot be held on the ground that B has accepted the
terms of the offer, for B has not done the act called for,-he has not
moved the safe from one office to the other,-before the time of the
revocation of the offer. In cases where the defendant has been
unjustly enriched there may be recovery in quasi-contract. But the
defendant in the principal case has not been unjustly enriched.
Therefore no recovery may be had on the theory of unjust enrich-
ment. Ashley suggests that in cases of this kind, the offeror should
be estopped from revoking his offer before the completion of the
work.4 The problem does not seem to have bothered Professor
179 Ga. 658 (1887).
2The following cases hold that a principal without incurring liability may
expressly or by a sale made by himself revoke a real estate agent's authority to
sell his land, before the agent has completed the act of finding a purchaser:
Auerbach v. Internationale Wolfram Lampen Aktien Gesellschaft, 177 Fed. 458
(191o); Rees v. Pellow, 97 Fed. x67 (1899); Milligan v. Owen, 123 Ia. 285 (1904);
Tracy v. Abney, 122 Ia. 3o6 (1904); Sibbald v. The Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N.Y.
378 (x881); Wylie v. The Marine National Bank, 6I N. Y. 425 (1875). In Siegel
v. Rosenzweig, 129 App. Div. (N. Y.) 547 (I9O8), it was held that a real estate
broker authorized by the owner of lands to offer them for sale on specific terms,
has, like the owner himself, a right to rescind the agency and may do so even when
he has procured a probable purchaser. Hence, having found a purchaser, he may
agree that the purchaser shall deal directly with the owner in consideration of the
payment of a commission by the purchaser. Such a contract does not rest upon
an immoral consideration, and the broker may recover his commission from the
purchaser on the completion of the sale.
'Ashley, Law of Contracts, p. 78.4Ashley, Law of Contracts, pp. 86-88: "An offer remaining open is simply a
statement by the offeror that he wishes a certain thing., and will continue in that
state of mind. Upon such indication of intent, the withdrawal of the offer, after
the offeree has accepted and started in to do the act in reliance thereon, will cause
loss. This suggests estoppelin pais. The doctrine of consideration is not affected
in any way. There is no promise until the consideration is performed, and the
offeror can never be held to his proposed promise unless he receives the considera-
tion, but nevertheless he cannot withdraw his offer. * * * * An estoppel
simply limits the power of revocation, and there is no good reason why this should
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Langdell. He says: "The true solution for both parties is to have a
binding contract made before the performance begins by mutual
promises." 5 Ashley's comment on this is: "This is much like reply-
ing to a question as to a specific for a certain poison 'Don't take the
poison'." 6
There has been much difficulty in dealing with cases involving this
problem. In Los Angeles Traction Company v. Wilshird' the defend-
ant agreed to pay the plaintiff a sum of money on the completion of
its street railroad to a certain point. The plaintiff bought a fran-
chise, and did considerable work on its track.. The defendant then
revoked his offer. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover the stipulated sum agreed upon. The court said: "When
the respondent purchased and paid upwards of fifteen hundred dollars
for a franchise, it had acted upon the contract; and it would be
manifestly unjust thereafter to permit the offer that had been made to
be withdrawn. The promised consideration had then been partly
performed, and the contract had taken on a bilateral character, and if
appellant thereafter thought he discovered a ground for rescinding the
contract, it was, as it always is, a necessary condition to the recission
that the party should be made whole as to what he had parted with on
the strength of the contract." It is not easy to see just what the
court means by this; for on strict theory no obligation on the part of
the promisor arose until the road was actually completed to the point
named. The court in its desire to give the injured party the relief
which it seemed to deserve was not particular about the legal reason-
ing it used. In the Minnesota case of Stensgaard v. Smith,8 where a
broker was given the exclusive agency to sell land and his authority
revoked after he had spent money in advertising and had made other
efforts to sell the land, the strict legal theory was applied, and recovery
fully protected." An interesting case in which the dictrine of estoppel is applied
to avoid defect of consideration is Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51 (1898).
Ricketts made a promissory note for $20oo and gave it to his granddaughter, Miss
Scothorn, who was employed as a bookkeeper. When he gave it to her he said:
"I have fixed out something that you have not got to work any more." Miss
Scothorn immediately gave up her work and remained unemployed for a year.
Ricketts died and Miss Scothorn brought an action on the note against his exec-
utor. The defendant pleaded want of consideration. The court said: "Hav-
ing intentionally influenced the plaintiff to alter her position for the worse, it
would be grossly inequitable to permit the maker, or his executor, to resist pay-
ment on the ground that the promise was given without consideration. The pe-
tition charges the elements of an equitable estoppel, and the evidence conclu-
sively establishes them." The executor was estopped to deny consideration for
the note.
'Langdell, Summary of Contract, sec. 4.
*Ashley, Law of Contracts, p. 88, note 2. For a criticism of Ashley's views see
28 LAw QUAR. REv. Ioo. The reviewer says: "Both the plain man and the
average lawyer will say that, whatever Prof. Ashley's logic may be, the law
really cannot be so absurd as that: and they will be right, and, what is more, any
rational court before whom such a question is moved will surely find a way to make
them so."
7135 Cal. 654 (1902).843 Minn. ii (189o).
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refused. A later case9 in the same jurisdiction allowed the broker to
recover, and a rather unsatisfactory attempt was made to reconcile
this conclusion with the decision in Stensgaard v. Smith, supra. In
an Alabama case 0 it is remarked: "Even though an agreement is,
when made, unilateral, if the party in whose favor the promise is
made accepts its performance, or does any act in recognition of its
implied or intended, though unexpressed, consideration, this supplies
the element of mutuality and gives a right of action."
When a broker is given an agency to sell real estate, the courts at
times seem eager to construe the contract so as to make it come within
either one or the other of two classes of cases where there is no diffi-
culty in allowing recovery. The first of these classes is where the
contract is bilateral; the owner promises to pay the broker a commis-
sion in consideration of the broker's promise to make efforts and incur
expenses in finding a purchaser." The other class is where the con-
tract is unilateral, but the owner promises to pay the broker, not in
consideration of his finding a purchaser, but in consideration of his
efforts to find one. 2 Some courts have said that where the considera-
tion does not appear on the face of the contract, it may be found by
implication, or proved by parol.14  But when a consideration is once
found, the principal, though he has the power to revoke, does not have
the right to revoke, and may become liable in damages if he does so.15
In several cases analagous to the principal case the courts permit
recovery and do not raise the question of consideration. 6
9Lapham v. Flint, 86 Minn. 376 (1902). The court il this case says: "The
contract under consideration in Stensgaard v. Smith, supra, contained no express
provision that the owner should pay the agent commission in case he should him-
self make the sale. The only question before the court in that case was whether
the contract, upon its face, unaided by evidence or allegations in the complaint,
expressed a mutuality of obligation; and it was properly held that it did not,
because there was nothing in the contract to indicate any acceptance of the obliga-
tion, either in writing or by performance. But in the case before us, conceding
that the contract, upon its face, is unilateral, and does not express mutuality of
agreement, yet the complaint alleged that, after delivery of the contract, the
respondent performed services in pursuance thereof, by listing and advertising the
property, and endeavoring to sell it. This allegation is sufficient to support
evidence of acceptance by the agent."
"Pullman Co. v. Meyer, 195 Ala. 397, 401 (1916). See also De Wolf Co. v.
Harvey, 161 Wis. 535 (1915).
"Rowan & Co. v. Hull, 55 W. Va. 335 (1904)-
12In the following cases the contract expressly provided that the consideration
for the promise of the owner should be the efforts of the broker in attempting to
find a purchaser: Kimmell v. Skelly, I3O Cal. 555 (19oo); Maze v. Gordon, 96
Cal. 61 (1892); Crane v. McCormick, 92 Cal 176 (i89i). In Long v. Herr. io
Colo. 380 (1887) and Metcalf v. Kent, 104 Ia. 487 (1898) the court found this to be
the consideration, though the contract did not expressly so provide. See also
Hoskins v. Fogg, 6o N. H. 402 (188o).
"
3Goward v. Waters, 98 Mass. 596 (1868).14Attix, Noyes & Co. v. Pelan, 5 Ia. 336 (1857). The contract recited a con-
sideration of $i, but the court paid no attention to this.15Cloe v. Rogers, 31 Okla. 255 (1912).
"
6Hardwick v. Marsh, 96 Ark. 23 (I9IO); Blumenthal v. Bridges, 91 Ark. 212
(19o9); Harrison v. Augerson, II5 Ill. App. 226 (1904); Schultz v. Griffin,
5 Misc. (N. Y.) 499 (1893). From the Arkansas cases it appears that the rule in
that state is that the broker will be allowed to recover where the agency is exclu-
sive, and that employment for a definite time implies an exclusive agency.
NOTES AND COMMENT
The reasoning used in the principal case is somewhat like that which
the California court uses inLos Angeles Traction Company v. Wilshire,17
and cannot be said to be in accord with strict legal principle. Where
it plainly appears that there was to be no commission under the
express offer until the very act called for has been done, it would seem
that the most satisfactory solution of the problem would be to allow
the plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of his labor and services
as having been performed at the implied request of the defendant. 8
There are of course many cases in which the owner authorizes several
brokers and gives to none an exclusive agency. In such cases, it
would ordinarily be unreasonable to find an implied request and no
recovery should be allowed.
Where, however, a request should be implied, recovery would be
allowed for expenses incurred. In the principal case, instead of
allowing the plaintiff to recover his commissions, it would seem that
the court should have allowed him to recover merely the reasonable
value of his services, upon the theory of an implied request.
Charles V. Parsell, Jr., 'ig.
Wills: Witnessing through an interpreter.-The question as to
whether a will can be made through the medium of an interpreter is
presented in the case of Hill v. Davis, x67 Pac. (Okla.) 465 (1917).
The testatrix could speak and understand only the Creek language.
Two of the three witnesses who purported to attest the execution could
not speak and understand that language; one of the witnesses could
speak and understand both languages. The declaration that the
instrument was her will and the request that the witnesses sign their
names thereto as such were made by the testatrix in the Creek lan-
guage. This was understood by one of the witnesses and interpreted
and repeated by him in English to the other two, the testatrix not
understanding the English interpretation. The court, overruling a
previous case in the same jurisdiction, held that the declaration and
request to sign were made by testatrix to only one attesting witness,
and the will was denied probate because the statute required two
attesting witnesses.
It is surprising that there is a dearth of authority on a question of
this kind which might have been expected to arise frequently. At
first blush it would seem that there should be no objection to a will
thus made because the use of an interpreter in business affairs is not
an uncommon occurrence and the courts consider him an agent for
both parties and that each party adopts the interpreter's words as the
words of the other party. But upon consideration of the reasons for
the strict provisions of the Statute of Wills, to prevent fraud and
imposition, and the attitude of the courts toward the statute, it can
be seen that the question is one not free from difficulty.
The question as to whether it is essential that there be a publication
of the instrument as the will of the testator was unsettled in the early
17Supra, note 7.8For a case which allows a real estate broker to recover in quantum reruit for
the reasonable value of his services, see Glover V. Henderson, 120 Mo. 367 (1894).
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part of the last century. By statute in New York in 1830 publication
was required, while in England it was settled in 1837 that publication
could be dispensed with.' Although the courts have said that only a
substantial compliance with the statute is necessary and that no
formal declaration or any particular words that the instrument is the
will of the testator are required,2 still they have from the first refused
to be satisfied with anything that would not fully comply with the
purposes of the statute, by which certain formalities are required in
order to minimize opportunities for fraud.3
Although no formal assertion is necessary it is well settled that it
is not sufficient that the witnesses have learned from other sources
that the document which they are called to attest is a will, or that
they suspect or infer from the circumstances that such is the character
of the paper.4 As was said in a leading New York case,5 "The fact
must in some manner, although no particular form of words is
required, be declared by the testator in their presence, that they may
not only know the fact, but that they may know it from him, and that
he understands it and at the time of its execution * * * *
designs to give effect to it as his will * * * * " Thus it has been
held that acts or signs by the testator which were understood by the
witnesses constituted a sufficient publication.6  A will may be valid
where the publication and request to sign is made through the inter-
vention of a third person, but the court requires the communication
by the third person to be made in the presence and hearing of the
testator and of the witnesses so that the witnesses may know, of their
own knowledge,. that what was said or done by the third person on
behalf of the testator was assented to by him.7  Where the publication
and request is made through an interpreter is it within the hearing of
the testator and witnesses, where neither can understand what is
being said to the other? Certainly the witnesses can not say of their
own knowledge that the testator intends the instrument to be his will.
And since the testator cannot understand what is being said to the
witnesses he cannot assent since the assent pre-supposes that he
knows what the interpreter is saying.
Where a third party stated that the instrument was the "will and
agreement" 8 or the "will and deed"' of the testator, and both the
testator and witnesses understood what he said, it was held there
was no valid publication. Where an interpreter is employed how
Remsen v. Brinckerhoff, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 325, 330 (1841).2Lewis v. Lewis, il N. Y. 220 (1854); Gilbert v. Knox, 52 N. Y. 125 (1873).3Remsen v. Brinckerhoff, supra, note I; Lewis v. Lewis, supra, note 2.4Lewis v. Lewis, supra, note 2.
5Lewis v. Lewis, supra, note 2.
6Lane v. Lane, 95 N. Y. 494 (1884).7Harp v. Parr, I68 Ill. 4 5 9 (1897); Elkinton v. Brick, 44 N. J. Eq. 154 (1888);
Coffin v. Coffin, 23 N. Y. 2, 15 (1861); Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y. 2 (x863); McDon-
ough v. Loughlin, 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 238 (1855); Thompson v. Stevens, 62 N. Y.
634 (1875); Burke v. Nolan, i Dem. (N. Y.) 436 (1882); In re Voorhis, 125 N. Y.
765 (1891); Troup v. Reid, 2 Dem. (N. Y.) 471 (x884); Gilbert v. Knox, supra,
note 2; Matter of Holmberg, 83 Misc. (N. Y.) 245 (1913).
"Rutherford v. Rutherford, I Denio. (N. Y.) 33 (1845).9Lewis v. Lewis, supra, note 2.
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are the witnesses to know the instrument is a will and not a deed or
some other document? They cannot infer it from the circumstances.10
The witnesses have no assurance except the statement of the inter-
preter, and the verity of his act would seem to be entirely dependent
upon his testimony, as to the truthful interpretation. It would seem
to be no answer that the parties have made the interpreter their agent
and both depended upon and adopted his words. The witnesses
must attest the acts of the testator. Attestation is a mental act
and whefe they cannot understand the testator, there is an absence of
understanding which ought not to be supplied by the statements of a
third party who may or may not be truthful. In the case of Bell,
Admr. v. Davis," which is expressly overruled by the principal case,
reliance was placed upon the adoption of the testator's words by each
party, but clearly the witnesses cannot attest of their own knowledge
when they must depend upon the verity of a third party for the truth-
fulness of the interpretation.
This conclusion is supported by a strong dictum in Stein v. Wil-
zinsk12 which seems to be the nearest case in point. There the
testator, a German woman, spoke broken English and understood
English and one of the witnesses who was unacquainted with German
asked her if the instrument was her will. She replied "Ja," which the
witness understood because another witness appeared to ask the
question in German and she answered the same way. It was held the
publication was good. The court assumed the exact situation which
is presented in the principal case and said it would fall far short of the
requirements of the statute.
In some instances in New York 3, and particularly in a recent case
in the Supreme Court, 4 the courts have used language which might be
deemed sufficiently broad to give validity to a will witnessed through
an interpreter, but the question presented in the principal case was
not involved. In view of the purposes of the formalities of the
statute it would seem that the holding of the principal case is correct.
Although in some cases hardship might result, the formalities pre-
scribed by the statute are safeguards thrown around the testator to
prevent fraud and imposition and as the right to make a will is
statutory and not an inherent right, they must be at least sub-
stantially complied with and it is doubtful whether they are here.
Harvey I. Tutchings, '18.
'
0Lewis v. Lewis, supra, note 2.
I55 Pac. (Okla.) 1132 (1916).
124 Redf. (N. Y.) 441, 448 (i88o).
"Lane v. Lane, supra, note 6; Matter of Hunt, iio N.Y. 278 (1888).
"Perham v. Cottle, 98 Misc. (N. Y.) 48 (1916).
